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A good seven years ago, as a part of a large-scale pay reform, the Danish public 
sector introduced results-based rewards (RBR), i.e. a pay component awarded 
for achieving or exceeding targets set in advance. RBR represent a possibility 
for combining wage-earners interests in higher wages with a general interest in 
higher efficiency in the public sector. With RBR, both parties get “something 
for something”. Thus it seems as if RBR could be a lever with which to 
increase wages. However, RBR have not gained ground in the local 
government. The present paper will discuss several reasons for the very limited 
use of RBR, illustrated with examples. The Danish experiences should give 
food for thought, given that pay systems used by the public sector are currently 
under transformation in practically all OECD countries. 
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The restructuring of the public sector in the OECD countries over the last 
decades has involved the introduction of new management tools, including new 
pay systems known from the private sector (Hood and Peters 2004, 
Christensen and Lægreid 2002, Lane 2000). Most OECD member countries 
have introduced performance-related pay i.e. variable pay according to 
performance. This has particularly been the case with senior managers, but 
increasingly also for non-managerial employees (OECD 2005). A specific form 
of PRP is results-based rewards (RBR), i.e. a pay component awarded for 
achieving or exceeding targets set in advance (OECD 2005:107). RBR are paid 
as lump-sum bonuses (one-off payments which are not consolidated into basic 
pay). The bonus can be a fixed amount for meeting certain pre-defined targets, 
or it can be dependent on the level of target achievement within the agreed 
period of time. RBR can be agreed for a single, or for more periods.  
Following the 1997 Danish public sector pay reform for central 
government and local government employees (Bregn 1998a), RBR became an 
optional pay element that could be awarded in addition to basic pay and 
supplements which could be given according to functions and qualifications. 
The present paper deals with RBR in the local government.1 Danish local 
government comprises counties and councils.2 Counties primary responsibilities 
are hospitals and high schools, while those of councils are primary schools and 
care facilities for children, the elderly, and disabled persons. 
RBR provide the possibility of combining wage-earners’ interests in 
higher wages with a general interest in higher efficiency in the public sector. 
RBR entail that both parties get “something for something”. Thus it seems as if 
RBR could be a lever for increasing wages.  
RBR, in the form of piece-rates, bonuses, commission schemes, etc. 
are familiar from the private sector (Prendergast 1999, Brown and Heywood 
2002). Remarkably, however, RBR have not gained ground when it comes to 
services provided by local government, and RBR have not been a lever for 
increasing wages in the local government. This paper summarises developments 
and the spread of the use of RBR in local government. It will do so based on 
statistics relating to councils’ and counties’ salary payments and other studies. 
We will look into the limited use of RBR, using the arguments for introducing 
RBR as our point of departure. Thereafter counter-arguments will be taken into 
consideration providing examples with RBR in the local government. By way of 
introduction, we will outline the development and spread of RBR in councils 
and counties. 
RBR use in councils and counties 
The pay system previously used by the Danish public sector was based on 
education and seniority, and pay scales were largely decided by collective 
bargaining (Bregn 1998a). With the 1998 pay reform, new pay systems were 
introduced, featuring a basic pay and the possibility of obtaining supplements 
according to functions and qualifications, plus, possibly, RBR. Basic pay rates 
were to be set by collective agreements, which would also go for certain 
                                                     
1 RBR in the central government are described in OECD (2005). 
2 The structure will change from 2007 onwards. Instead of counties larger regions are established 
with hospitals as the primary responsibility. Also the number of councils will be reduced, and the 
other responsibilities of the former counties will be taken over by the larger councils. 
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supplements. That apart, the key innovation was that supplements and RBR 
were agreed locally.  
RBR agreements are based on the 1997 frame agreement which was 
entered into further to the introduction of the new pay systems (KL3 et al. 
1997a).4 RBR are based on achieving certain pre-defined results, measurable or 
verifiable, and of a quantitative or qualitative nature (KL et al. 1997b, § 2, 
section 1). The cited purposes of RBR are: 
- Generating qualitative and/or quantitative improvements in task performance 
- Supporting local projects with the aim of enhancing professional skills, 
promoting new working methods, carrying out organisational changes, etc. (KL 
et al. 1997b, § 2, section 1). 
 
A distinction is made between the following forms of RBR: 
 
• RBR based on quantitative effectivisation, i.e. increasing productivity 
or services offered without a parallel increase in resource expenditure. 
Quantitative effectivisation must be measurable. 
• RBR based on qualitative effectivisation, i.e. enhancing product quality 
or offering more services without a parallel increase in resource 
expenditure. 
Qualitative effectivisation must be verifiable. 
• RBR founded on agreements, in which achieving specific tasks is made 
the criterion of RBR allocation.  
 
Thus, the three arrangements are based on agreements on a bonus related to 
pre-agreed criteria. However, a fourth type is in operation, for which, as an 
exception, no pre-agreement exists, namely RBR based on non-scheduled 
effectivisations according to which non-scheduled efficiency gains are 
remunerable “in particular situations”.  
RBR can be individual or group-based. RBR agreements are subject to 
negotiations between the employer and the employees' union or its local 
representative. This is similar to the principle that generally applies to the new 
pay systems in the Danish public sector.  
Data basis 
In the following, the spread of RBR will be examined, based on payroll data of 
Danish councils and counties, as submitted to Det fælleskommunale 
Løndatakontor (The National Wage Statistics Office of Danish local 
authorities) henceforth referred to as "FLD". FLD statistics do not cover the 
area fully, because a few councils are not included in FLD statistics. However, 
97 percent of the staff in Danish councils and counties are covered by the 
statistics. That is a good 600,000 people or a good half million in full-time 
equivalents (www.fldnet.dk). In addition to the publicly available FLD statistics, 
the present information is based on FLD data from a special run.  
The FLD statistics report the amount paid in RBR (“resultatløn”). 
However, the FLD statistics are not quite accurate as the category “other 
supplements” could also include RBR. The basis of the statistics is payroll data 
of the councils and counties which include different types of wage elements 
described in wage-codes. The use of wage-codes in the councils and 
communities could, however, have a pragmatic character and there are 
                                                     
3 Kommunernes Landsforening (The National Organisation of Local Authorities in Denmark), 
henceforth referred to as "KL". 
4 The RBR agreement superseded the effectivisation agreements introduced in 1989 by councils 
and counties (Frame agreement on the distribution of employees' share of effectivisation and 
rationalisation benefits) (KL 1991). These agreements only found very limited use (KTO et al. 
1996). 
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ambiguities related to some codes. However, although the FLD statistics 
underestimate the amounts of RBR paid, the information given about RBR is 
FLD’s best estimate of the volume and is officially reported as the volume year 
by year.5 
The definition of RBR in the agreement, compare above, implies that 
bonuses reported as RBR also include bonuses that are awarded without pre-
existing schemes with pre-defined criteria. Thus, some of the payments 
included in RBR could be ad hoc bonuses paid for an extraordinary effort, etc. 
This could be a source of overrating RBR in a strict sense, since reported 
amounts also include salary portions that are not RBR in a strict sense, 
understood as “a pay component that is paid for achieving or exceeding targets 
set in advance”. 
Below, findings based on the FLD statistics concerning RBR will be 
compared with other estimates of RBR spread.  
Spread and development 
The development in RBR as reported by FLD is shown in the following table. 
 
Tabel 1. The amount (in DKK and Euro) of results-based rewards (RBR) in 
local government 1998-2004 
 
 
Tabel 1. The amount (in DKK and Euro) of results-based rewards (RBR) 
in local government 1998-2004 




1998 1.7  0.2 
1999 4.6 0.6 
2000 6.9 0.9 
2001 6.4 0.9 
2002 7.4 1.0 
2003 14.1 1.9 
2004 16.8 1 2.2  
 
1 The City of Copenhagen figures are not included for months June through December as they 
are not available. As a basis for evaluating the significance of this we should note that aggregate 
RBR payments for all of 2003 were at only DKK 210,000 [roughly EUR 28,000]). RBR payments 
for months January through May were only DKK 29,000 [roughly EUR 3900]. 
Note: The amounts for 1998-2000 is estimated based on information from 4 months in the 
middle of the quarters. 
Source: FLD 
                                                     
5 During 2006 the statistics will be improved as the FLD will get more disaggregated information 
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Tabel 2. The amount (in DKK and Euro) of results-based rewards (RBR) in 
local government January-October 2005 compared to January-October 2004 




January-October 2005 13.41 1.8 
January- October 2004 13.62 1.8 
 
1 The City of Copenhagen figures are not included as they are not available. 
2 For comparison purposes the City of Copenhagen figures are not included. However, this 
makes no real difference as the aggregate RBR payments during January- May 2004 were only 
29,000 DKK [roughly 3900 EUR]. 
Source: FLD 
 
The amount paid in RBR is very small. According to 2004 wages statistics (the 
last year for which a complete report is available), payments totalled 
approximately 17 million DKK [roughly 1.9 million EUR].6 Computed in 
relation to the 2004 payroll total of about 160 billion DKK [roughly 21 billion 
EUR], the amount of RBR payments is practically negligible.  
The number of employees in local government who received RBR in 
2004 is also very limited, approximately 5,800 staff in full-time equivalents. This 
means that a good one percent of the local government employees (in full-time 
equivalents) received RBR. The number of persons could then be larger as 
some who receive RBR can be part-time employees.  
Average amounts of RBR are small. The average for the employees 
who received RBR in 2004 is less than DKK 3,000 [roughly EUR 400], or 
approximately one per cent of the average income.  
The very limited spread compares with other studies which have also 
found the use of RBR to be very limited. Based on a study from the spring of 
2001, Ibsen and Christensen (2002:242-43) found that RBR schemes practically 
had not been used by local government. Since 1997, just four to six percent 
have been covered by a RBR scheme. 
In 2004, Gallup carried out a poll based on Gallup's web-based panel, 
which also included an item regarding RBR (tns Gallup 2004). 2,685 employees 
in councils and counties answered the questionnaire; no opt-out figure is given. 
6 percent of the respondents answered that they had received RBR. However, it 
is uncertain how often and what is actually considered as being RBR.  
As for the trend, we found a significant rise in RBR amounts paid in the first 
years upon introduction, but this development has levelled out, compare tables 
1 and 2. The amount paid in RBR in the first 10 months of 2005 was at the 
same level as for the first 10 months of 2004.7 
The total picture is that RBR have a very limited spread in the local 
government. Furthermore, the average amounts of RBR are small. Moreover, 
the increase in the RBR amount paid in the first years has levelled out.  
                                                     
6 Copenhagen figures are not included for months June through December as they are not 
available. As a basis for evaluating the significance of this we should note that aggregate RBR 
payments in Copenhagen for all of 2003 were at DKK 210,000 [roughly EUR 28,000] and for 
January through May 2004 DKK 29,000 [roughly EUR 3900]. 
7 13,6 million DKK [roughly1,8 million EUR] was paid in RBR in the first 10 months of 2004 
and 13,4 million DKK [roughly 1,8 million EUR] in the first 10 months of 2005. For comparison 
purposes the City of Copenhagen figures are not included as they are not available after May 
2004. Concerning the aggregate RBR payments in Copenhagen January through May 2004, see 
note 6. 
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RBR: pros and cons 
Below, we will review some arguments, primarily for public sector managers, in 
favour of introducing RBR, followed by some arguments that could speak 
against RBR. These will be the basis of the subsequent discussion of the 
reasons underlying the limited spread of RBR and their limited importance as 
an element of wages. 
Arguments favouring RBR 
Economic incentive to show results 
A classic economic argument for RBR is that it motivates people to making an 
extra effort. Thus, by providing an incentive for employees to show results 
when remunerated according to these results, one will not have to monitor their 
inputs. If the RBR scheme which is introduced reflects, for example, the 
number of cases handled, this provides an incentive to complete tasks. The 
theory behind this argument has been set out in the principal-agent theory 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Prendergast 1999). 
Managerial monitoring can also provide an incentive for an improved 
effort. However, this will require that managerial monitoring is actually an 
option. Most of the time, a manager cannot fully observe what employees are 
doing. And even when the employees' work does lend itself to observation, a 
manager may not be able to ascertain whether their efforts are used 
appropriately. If an employee has access to information about what should be 
done, including where to put in the effort, that is not available to the manager, 
then managerial monitoring can be ineffective, while economic incentives 
would be a more effective means of promoting the desired behaviour.  
Given stable conditions other things being equal, a manager will often 
be well informed as to what the employee needs to do, while such knowledge 
may be absent under turbulent conditions. Seen alone, this could speak for 
introducing RBR schemes in the latter case, encouraging employees to draw on 
their knowledge in order to show results (Prendergast 2000, 2002). On the 
other hand, such turbulent conditions can make it difficult to design RBR 
schemes in such a manner that they do in fact reflect employees' efforts, and 
not circumstances beyond the employees' control. If there is considerable 
uncertainty as to the relationship between employees' effort and the outcome, 
such that the outcome is influenced considerably by circumstances beyond the 
employees' control, this would speak against RBR. Thus, employees are 
typically risk-averse, and for good reason. This means that they prefer a 
guaranteed amount, rather than an amount of the same anticipated value, yet 
associated with an element of uncertainty. The greater this uncertainty, the less 
the utility of the same expected amount to a risk-averse individual. Hence, 
other things being equal, the value of RBR will lessen with the uncertainty. As a 
result, creating an incentive of a given magnitude will be costlier, the more 
uncertain it is what the result of putting in an extra effort would be. So while 
there could be arguments favouring RBR where managerial monitoring is 
difficult, uncertainty would, on the other hand, speak against RBR. 
A number of Danish councils use contract management, i.e. a contract 
drawn up between the head of an institution and the local authority, specifying 
the targets to be achieved by the institution (Klausen 2004, Greve and Ejersbo 
2005). Here linking a RBR scheme to target achievement can increase the 
incentive to show results in relation to the contract. Typically, there are far 
more possibilities of formulating adequate targets at an aggregate level as for 
the institution than for lower-ranking employees in an organization. As for 
   
11 
uncertainty, it could be adduced that handling uncertainty is precisely what 
executives and managers are supposed to do. 
Focus on goals 
RBR make goals visible. Even with RBR payments of a limited size, providing a 
modest economic incentive, the very formulation of goals can boost efficiency 
by creating a focus on the goals (Locke and Latham 1990 og 2002). RBR 
require a setting of goals, which can indirectly contribute towards effectiveness 
in a given organization (Marsden 2004, OECD 2004a). A successful goal setting 
process evolves as a dialogue with the employees, and consequently, RBR can 
also indirectly help promote co-operation between management and staff. 
Bringing information to the fore  
RBR can also provide management with information as to what results 
employees can deliver. Often employees have information that managers do 
not have, for example how much time is needed to complete different types of 
tasks. Employees know that, but they do not have an inherent interest in 
disclosing their knowledge to their managers. To the extent a RBR scheme 
leads to greater productivity, information is also brought to the fore. Such 
information will be available for the managers for future use, regardless of 
whether RBR schemes continue or not.  
When being introduced RBR schemes will often be designed by trial-
and-error, and agreements are typically made for 12 months at a time. Once 
employees have demonstrated that they are able to increase their output, 
demands for higher productivity in future RBR agreements can result. This has 
been termed "the ratchet effect" (Weitzman 1980). It implies that entering RBR 
agreements can be a mixed blessing for the employees: they may only get a one-
off amount for raising their productivity to a level that could be difficult to go 
back on in the future, even if the RBR schemes are later discontinued. 
Quid pro quo 
RBR imply that in return for pay bonuses, employees will show results on a 
current basis. RBR can pave the way for acceptance of new work standards. A 
greater work effort is rewarded with a better pay. This is why RBR can be used 
as a very direct tool towards a ’renegotiation of the effort bargain’ (Marsden 
2004). Using RBR means that both parties get ”something for something”. 
Obviously, on the wage earners' part, there is an interest in permanent 
supplements that provide stable incomes and do not require them to meet new 
requirements on a current basis. But at the same time, RBR can offer an 
opportunity to achieve a pay bonus beyond what can be negotiated for 
permanent pay rises. A project launched by KL, which is the interest group and 
member authority of local authorities in Denmark8 and the Association of 
Local Government Employees’ Organisations (the KTO) in 2005 with the 
purpose of contributing to the spread of RBR use (primarily through 
information) can be seen in this perspective. 
RBR can also create acceptance of control. When employees are to be 
awarded RBR, their results need to be inventoried. Creating acceptance of 
control may be easier if control is introduced in connection with an RBR 
scheme. 
A more specific argument favouring RBR could be that it can be 
instrumental in maintaining activity during vacancies without needing to hire 
temps. For some jobs finding qualified temps to help out during short-term 
                                                     
8 Apart from the City of Copenhagen and the Borough of Frederiksberg, which attend county 
authority tasks, all local authorities in Denmark are members of KL 
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vacancies can be a difficult matter. Moreover, in some areas, the need for run-in 
time can make it less practical. Instead, by using a RBR scheme, employees can 
share in the saving derived from saved wage costs.  
Alternative to outsourcings 
RBR can also be an alternative to outsourcing. In areas where outsourcing is an 
option, there will be market rates to compare with, so the cost of producing a 
given service in a local council framework can be calculated. Thus, for such 
areas, it is possible to compute actual savings by productivity gains, and 
employees can be encouraged to contribute via RBR relative to the budget 
surplus. For employees, this could mean preserving jobs in the public sector. In 
addition, RBR would allow a pay rise as a result of improved productivity. 
Indeed, we do find several examples of RBR within the technical sector, such as 
roads and parks maintenance. 
Demonstration effect and political arguments 
An argument for adopting RBR for executives and managers, and also in 
administration could be the demonstration effect of showing that they are 
prepared to “take their own medicine”. If, as a manager, one intends to make 
RBR use more widespread, the concept may be easier to sell if one are on RBR 
oneself. As for the salaries and human resources areas, a specific argument 
could be that since you will have a consultancy role in spreading and designing 
RBR schemes, it could be convenient to have first-hand experience with this 
pay component.  
At the political level, RBR can have a positive ring to them. Pay rises 
linked with results will be legitimate and coincide with targets on results 
orientation within the public sector.  
Arguments against RBR 
The risk of getting what you pay for…. 
A fundamental argument against the use of RBR is that when it comes to 
public service production, a RBR scheme may be difficult to design without 
causing dysfunctional behavioral responses. There is a risk that work effort is 
put into tasks that carry awards, to the detriment of other tasks that belong to 
the job, yet are not paid extra, since not included in the RBR scheme 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). A problem with RBR is, paradoxically, the 
risk that employees do what the RBR gives them an incentive to do. The fact is 
that often a RBR scheme cannot be designed so as to produce the desired result 
when employees do what pays for them. This typically owes to the fact that not 
all results are directly measurable. A classic problem is related to the quality of 
work. For instance problems involving legal rights issues may arise during 
handling cases (Overgaard 1994) if the employees are paid according to the 
number of handled cases.  
One technical administration had introduced RBR for a number of 
tasks (e.g. number of building permits handled, property data forms, number of 
building development cases), and in order to avoid misprioritisation of tasks, 
they also considered including enquiries from citizens – personal, by phone or 
by e-mail – in their RBR scheme. If the number of phone enquiries is linked up 
with an award, there is a risk of quality problems, even outright cheating. If the 
number of calls is recorded, merely disconnecting – regardless why – could 
cause a renewed call to be recorded. An insufficient answer will require another 
call, meaning that a complete answer will be counted as two or more calls. 
Several cases of circumvention of performance measurements are known from 
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’call centres’ (Fernie and Metcalf 1998, comp. also Callaghan and Thompson 
2001, Taylor and Bain 2001 for examples of varying patterns of resistance to 
control at call centres). In a smaller council authority, where people know one 
another to a certain extent, the employees may be less inclined to respond 
instrumentally to a RBR scheme linked with the number of phone calls 
answered. But the more anonymous the relations between local administration 
and citizens, the greater the potential risk that RBR will result in poorer quality. 
A RBR scheme used by one local authority gave RBR to roads and 
parks maintenance staff for taking on tasks beyond their designated core tasks. 
As a result, they occasionally gave lower priority to solving core tasks in favour 
of tasks that would contribute to RBR pay (KL 2004:42). 
Aspects such as management monitoring, considerations about 
obtaining other rewards based on subjective assessments, etc. may counteract 
such negative effects. All the same, a RBR scheme that encourages behaviour 
other than the desired will be inappropriate – not least due to the symbolic 
value associated with rewards, however small they are. Moreover, rewards 
based on subjective assessments have other inherent problems, including the 
risk that assessments are not felt to be fair and have a divisive effect 
(Prendergast 1999, Marsden 1994, 1998, 2004, Heery 1998, OECD 1993, 1997, 
2005). 
 Whether or not a RBR scheme can be designed to encourage the 
desired results depends on the concrete context and in particular whether the 
formulation of adequate and measurable results’ targets are possible. Generally, 
the fact that adequate results’ targets are easier to design for an aggregated level 
(e.g. an institution) than for individual employees would justify greater use of 
RBR for executives and managers than for other staff. 
The result reflects something other than employees' efforts 
An effective RBR scheme should be designed so the result depends maximally 
on the employees' work effort (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). However, such a 
requirement can be difficult to meet in practice (Bregn 1998b). The result 
achieved by an individual or a group of employees can be coloured by internal 
circumstances, including the efforts – or lack thereof – of others within the 
institution. Achievable output may also hinge on external circumstances beyond 
the influence of the relevant organisation. The number of solvable tasks 
depends on e.g. how difficult and comprehensive they are. Differentiating the 
results target, by letting the more difficult and time-consuming tasks weigh 
more heavily in the results account would limit uncertainty, since employees 
would no longer be influenced by changes in task composition. However, 
sorting and attributing weights to tasks can be a difficult and costly undertaking. 
One RBR scheme awarded RBR to a group of employees whose task 
was to get clients out of the social support system, according to how much they 
could reduce the number of social support recipients. However, the number of 
social support recipients does not just depend on the employees' zeal in trying 
to find jobs for them, but also reflects general market trends. So when the 
scheme generated considerable RBR payments for these employees in the first 
year following its introduction, one reason was favourable market trends (Bregn 
1997).  
You can try to design results’ targets to make up for such aspects. On 
the other hand, this could make results’ targets complex, and hence less 
transparent. A possible option is to include a renegotiation clause in the 
scheme, implying that it can be renegotiated should conditions for target 
achievement change in a decisive way. But a renegotiation will require both 
parties to accept an amendment of the scheme, otherwise, it will be binding for 
the entire agreement period.  
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Where a target is linked with quality, user surveys could be considered as a 
quality indicator. However, this would mean that the appraisal could be 
influenced by irrelevant circumstances. One RBR scheme included customer 
satisfaction as a target for a transport manager whose responsibilities included 
transfer of disabled citizens to council facilities. Customer satisfaction was 
measured based on statements by three council managers, including the 
manager of the Adults and Disabled Section, who appraises whether time 
schedules are observed so there are no waits, and the chief officer of Culture 
and Welfare, whose appraisal is based on politicians' statements, plus the 
opinions of school principals, parents, and the local community group. The 
latter appraisal in particular is very uncertain. An argument for the scheme is its 
quality benefits, because the transport manager actually has to take an interest 
in his reputation, and may enquire with the relevant persons on an ongoing 
basis. The agreement was entered for a single year, so it carried a limited risk 
for the employee, presumably acceptable given the potential bonus pay built 
into the agreement. More comprehensive and valid satisfaction surveys would 
entail greater transaction costs, without necessarily improving their utility. 
A RBR scheme for group managers in a section servicing elderly and 
disabled included a quality target. It was computed based on the number of 
"relevant complaints". The district management (district manager, home care 
manager and activity manager) will decide whether a complaint is "relevant", or 
just a "querulous complaint". This may involve a considerable discretionary 
element, so confidence in their judgment is all-important.  
There is increasing awareness about the importance of user time 
percentages, also termed ”face-to-face time” and expressing the amount of time 
available to citizens receiving services such as senior care. The results target of 
the aforementioned scheme included ”face-to-face time”. The amount of time 
actually spent with the user will depend on for example absence due to 
sickness. While the frequency of sickness absence can be a work environment 
indicator, sick absence also reflects circumstances beyond the management's 
control. In particular, long-term sickness absence due to serious illness can 
impact heavily on sickness absence figures in smaller units. If the management 
focuses on reducing short-term sickness absence, this may cause employees to 
remain absent for longer, thus changing short-term into longer-term sickness 
absence.  
A scheme used in the roads and parks section was designed so as to 
include quality as a results target. However, RBR would be payable only when 
efficiency improvements have led to savings. This caused discontent among 
employees in situations when they had delivered work of a quality justifying 
RBR payments, yet did not receive any because – for reasons beyond the 
employees' control – there was no sum to distribute (KL 2004:43). 
Administrative costs  
One argument against RBR schemes is the involved costs, in the form of time 
spent designing, negotiating, administering, and adjusting the RBR scheme, if 
need be. Also including time spent negotiating amendments of the scheme, 
should conditions change. Such transaction costs may reflect the fact that this 
can be difficult to handle – due to the work tasks themselves. However, the 
reason could also be incomplete knowledge of whatever goes on within a given 
unit, and uncertainty as to the core tasks involved. Clearing up such questions 
can have a value on its own and also lead to an organizational check-up, which 
in turn could result in organizational development and efficiency gains. Also 
costs involved in appraising target achievement, including quality assessment, 
can have a value per se and should not merely be seen as an RBR-related cost. 
Moreover, the administrative costs of RBR should be considered against a 
possible reduction in the cost of managerial monitoring. 
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Transaction costs can also arise from conflicts of interest. One technical 
administration under a local authority introduced contract management of their 
roads and parks section along with a RBR scheme. It implied that employees of 
the roads and parks section would receive a share of the amount accrued by 
taking on tasks beyond those outlined in the results contracts. However, this 
led to discussions as to whether or not a service is covered by the contract. 
Moreover, invoices for tasks not included in the contract have been larger than 
they should according to the price basis normally used. These are all familiar 
problems when contracting with private enterprises.9 With RBR such problems 
also occur within a local council. Apart from being time-consuming and 
therefore costly, such discussions can also increase costs in a wider sense by 
eroding the co-operative climate (KL 2004:44). 
Crowding out of intrinsic motivation 
A marked feature with many public sector jobs is that employees have an 
intrinsic motivation, which involves commitment and a wish to "do a good 
job", e.g. for the elderly, children, the disabled, etc. (Francois 2000). 
Introducing RBR may cause this job-related "intrinsic" motivation to be 
crowded out by a motivation linked with the "extrinsic" award (Frey 1997, Frey 
and Jegen 2001). If RBR schemes are designed to include the right incentives, 
and thus encourage the desired behaviour – then the net outcome can be 
positive, even though an intrinsic motivation is undermined. But there is a 
problem if the RBR schemes cannot be designed to encourage the behaviour 
desired from the home care assistant, nurse, educationist, teacher, etc. This can 
happen, for one thing because several jobs do not lend themselves easily to 
coining adequate and complete targets (Fehr and Schmidt 2004). The inner 
voice prompting one to do the right thing may then be drowned by another 
voice telling one to do whatever pays. What is more, RBR schemes can also 
make people feel they can legitimately do whatever is most rewarding in 
financial terms, since the scheme has already announced what counts as results. 
In this way professional norms may be eroded. 
Spill-over effects and bargaining culture 
RBR can also produce spill-over effects where RBR for one group create 
expectations of RBR for other groups, and where RBR in one area create 
expectations of RBR in other areas (Frey 1997) – including those for which 
RBR schemes are less suited. For example, when RBR are awarded for specific 
tasks, for joining project groups, for undertaking the management of project 
groups etc., this naturally builds expectations that such tasks will also qualify for 
RBR in the future.  
Generally, there is a risk for RBR schemes to contribute to a mercenary 
and bargaining culture with ongoing discussions and negotiations as to what is 
included in basic pay, and what is new, extra or more that requires separate 
RBR pay. One organisation had worked up a case backlog which their 
management wanted to have settled.10 Staff workers could then take on a 
number of cases, to be paid with RBR. Moreover, a system was in place, setting 
standards for the case-working output to be achieved by the individual offices. 
As a result of the RBR scheme, employees raised demands for day-to-day 
casework to also carry RBR, whenever the number of cases worked exceeded 
the set standard.  
                                                     
9 Concerning the choice between market or hierarchy, see Williamson (1985) 
10 This example is from the central government. 
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Reward and price 
While RBR can be seen as a reward for taking on specific tasks, it can also be 
interpreted as the price to be paid for not taking them on (Gneezy and 
Rustichini 2000a). If RBR are so low that they do not reflect the costs of taking 
on a task, then the individual employee can take the situation to imply that you 
can buy yourself out of such tasks by renouncing RBR. One organisation 
distributed RBR among employees according to their individual scores. These 
scores were, among other things, given for taking on less popular tasks, such as 
"out-of-the-house activities" requiring them to be out for longer than a normal 
working day. While the intention is to encourage staff to take on such tasks on 
a voluntary basis, the actual effect may be the opposite, since the rewards 
scheme suggests that you can buy your way out of those tasks by renouncing 
RBR. The moral incentive to stand shoulder to shoulder on tasks can be 
dampened by the fact that a bonus is now being paid to those who take them 
on. If the bonus do not reflect the inconvenience associated with the tasks, this 
could make employees reluctant to take them on, quite opposite to the intended 
effect (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b).  
RBR are not pensionable income 
Although of minor importance a circumstance of particular relevance for 
Denmark is that the 2002 collective labour agreements included an agreement 
that all supplements given for functions and qualifications are pensionable, 
while RBR payments basically are not. From a wage earner viewpoint, this 
makes RBR less attractive. However, RBR can be pensionable, provided that 
specific agreements are made between the parties. 
Reasons for the limited spread of RBR  
From the private sector there is evidence that RBR, in the form of piece-rates, 
will boost productivity. This effect owes in part to a selection effect, i.e. that 
piece-rate pay will attract the more productive, and in part to a motivational 
effect that boosts achievements among those already employed (Lazear 2000, 
Prendergast 1999). We also typically find that when converted into hourly pay, 
piece-rate pay is higher than hourly pay in the sector. Thus, introducing RBR in 
the public sector would suggest itself. A salary system encouraging staff to 
show results should be a potent salary system, in terms of improving public 
sector efficiency.  
Even so, RBR are not in wide use in the local government today, 
which may reflect the fact that often there are no adequate objective results 
targets, on which to base an RBR scheme. And to the extent objective targets 
exist, pay according to these will lead to dysfunctions whenever there are 
targets other than those rewarded. The risk is that you will get what you pay 
for, and not what you hope (Kerr 1975).  
In areas as the technical operations sector (notably roads and parks 
maintenance), RBR are facilitated as results targets could largely be based on 
market rates, including calculations of savings derived from improved 
productivity. However, this also implies that several problems known from 
market transactions can now turn up within the public organisation when 
individual agents try to maximise their own financial benefits. A RBR scheme 
may come in as an interim solution to be used during preparations for 
outsourcing. Hence, outsourcing can narrow the ground for task areas that 
would make a good basis for RBR use. 
Under stable conditions, management has considerable knowledge of 
tasks and the conditions for completing them. Here, management monitoring 
could provide incentives to greater efficiency. With unstable conditions, there 
may be arguments for RBR, if the employees know better than their manager 
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what should be done, so efficiency by managerial monitoring cannot be secured 
fully. However, designing RBR schemes will also be difficult and costly, since 
these will need adjustments as tasks and conditions of work change. What is 
more, this instability also implies that there may be a considerable uncertainty in 
correlation between the employees' efforts and their outcomes, meaning that 
results reflect things other than the employees' effort. These aspects speak 
against RBR. 
Many activities within the public sector involve teamwork with co-
operative elements, which makes it difficult to prepare individual result targets. 
Generally, targets are easier to design for an aggregated level (e.g. groups and 
sections, or an entire institution) than for individual employees, which would 
justify a wider use of RBR for executives and managers. Moreover, managerial 
transactions carry particularly significant consequences. However, RBR 
schemes for executives and managers may create tensions in relation to the 
employees who are to produce the output, for which executives and managers 
are awarded RBR. In turn, this may also trigger demands for RBR for the 
remaining staff, meaning that RBR for executives and managers can work as a 
lever for RBR to all employees. 
If RBR schemes cannot be designed to encourage the behaviours that 
the relevant employees consider professionally correct such schemes may 
eventually demotivate public employees. For a number of areas, an effort 
towards developing professional "best practice" standards and general 
managerial monitoring may be a better alternative than pay systems that shift 
the behaviour of the employees towards what is most profitable for themselves, 
and which carries a risk of several undesirable socio-psychological effects. 
There might be arguments for paying special tasks with RBR in the 
form of a lump sum for completing the task. However, the risk of spill-over 
effects may call for some caution, since RBR for a given task could generate 
expectations that RBR will also be paid for other tasks. More generally, RBR 
can inspire a mercenary culture that may obstruct management and co-
operation.  
Conclusion 
RBR were introduced in Danish local government more than seven years ago, 
as a possible pay component in a new pay reform. The main principle was that 
wage increments above the increments obtained through collective agreements 
should be obtained by supplements according to qualifications and functions 
and possibly RBR. RBR could seem to be a way to wage increases which is also 
in the interests of the public sector because the amounts paid corresponds to 
improvements in public sector efficiency. However, the developments has 
shown that RBR have not been a source of wage increments. The spread is very 
limited and the average amount paid to the rather few employees are small.  
Several circumstances can account for the exceedingly limited use of 
RBR. For many task areas, defining adequate targets for the desired results is 
difficult. This may cause dysfunctional behavioral responses where employees 
allocate effort to show results in relation to the targets to the detriment of other 
desired results which are not paid extra, since not included in the RBR scheme. 
Moreover, results will often reflect influences other than the employees' efforts, 
meaning that the correlation between their efforts and output is an uncertain 
one. The consequence could be frustration if efforts and output do not add up, 
because other circumstances interfere with target achievement. When explicit 
payment for specific tasks is introduced, there is also a risk of undesirable 
socio-psychological effects and changes in norms, which could cause the 
market’s problems to be introduced into a public organisation. Due to spill-
over effects, the introduction of RBR in one area may meet with demands for 
RBR in other areas, and groups for whom it is less suited. Moreover, the costs 
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of having to negotiate, design and administer schemes may be considerable, 
including amendments whenever circumstances change. 
The optimal potentials for RBR are where outputs are easy to measure, 
including sections where savings can be based on market prices, e.g. within 
technical operations. On the other hand, once these requirements have been 
met, a basis will have been made for outsourcing, which in turn will limit the 
distribution range for RBR use. For managers and leaders RBR could gain 
increasing importance as contract management gain ground. This development 
can be accelerated by the reform of the local government which means fewer 
and larger units, as contract management is more spread in larger councils than 
smaller (Greve and Ejersbo 2005.). However, for the broad group of employees 
there are no signs of RBR as a lever of wage-increases. The Danish experiences 
with RBR in local government should give food for thought, in an era when 
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